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RUSSIA'S POSITION TOWARD OTTOMAN 
ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS 
AN 1816 INSTRUCTION FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY 
Theophilus C. Prousis 
Documents on tsarist policy in the Near East offer suggestive 
detail, subtle nuance, and firsthand commentary on the proposed 
if not actual state of Russo-Ottoman affairs regarding specific 
issues between the two neighboring autocratic empires. These fea-
tures, to varying degrees, are manifested in this translated directive 
ofJune 1816, from Foreign Minister Karl V. Nessel'rode to envoy 
Grigorii A. Stroganov in Istanbul, dealing with Russia's attitude 
toward the sultan's Eastern Orthodox subjects in the aftermath of 
the Congress of Vienna. The Foreign Ministry's instruction merits 
attention by scholars oflmperial Russia's involvement in the East-
ern Question as a reminder that primary sources on particular 
aspects of the Russo-Ottoman nexus warrant closer scrutiny and 
critical commentary. 
The Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) 
holds extensive records for the study of Russia's contacts and con-
nections with the far-flung regions of the Ottoman Empire. 1 The 
Foreign Ministry dispatch presented here provides but one example of 
the wealth and variety of AVPRI records, published and unpublished, 
I For an introduction to AVPRI's rich resources, see the archival guide of I. V. 
Budnik, ed., Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi fmperii: Putevoditel' (Minneapolis: 
East View Publications, Inc., 1995). Because Western scholars have had full access 
to this institution only since 1990, identifying some of the actual collections pro-
vides a useful research rool for specialists in the field. For a sampling of A VPRI hold-
ings on tsarist interests in the Near East, see Theophilus C. Prousis, "AVPR (Arkhiv 
Vneshnei Politiki Rossii) and the Orthodox East," Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 
12/13 (I 996-97): 473-503, and idem, "A Guide to AVPRI Materials on Russian 
Consuls and Commerce in the Near East," Modern Greek Studies 16117 
(forthcoming) . 
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that deserve a more prominent place in scholarship on Russo-
Ottoman relations in general and on the religious dimension of tsarist 
policy in particular.2 Russian scholars in the Soviet era certainly uti-
lized AVPRI's treasure trove for their important works on Russian 
activities in the Balkans, Greece, and the wider Ottoman world.3 
Yet they generally downplayed or neglectetl the religious element in 
tsarist ties with the Greek or Orthodox East, the term often used for 
the Eastern Orthodox lands and peoples under Ottoman rule that 
were formerly part of the Byzantine Empire. The most promising 
development to fill this gap, and symptomatic of Russia's recovery 
of religious identity, is the recent publication of two volumes of 
AVPRI materials on Russia's diplomatic, economic, religious, and 
cultural presence in the holy land during the late Imperial period.4 
2 Ministerstvo inostrannykh de! SSSR, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX v.: 
Dokumenry Rossiiskogo ministerstva inostrannykh de!, 16 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1960-
1995), hereafter cited as VPR, with published documents on Russo-Ottoman border 
disputes, treaty agreements, trade, shipping, and consular affairs. 
3 Examples of Soviet scholarship based on A VPRI materials include Avgusta M. 
Stanislavskaia, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia i problemy Sredizemnomor'ia (1798-1807) 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1962), idem, Rossiia i Gretsiia v kontse XVIIl-nachale XIX v.: Politika 
Rossii v lonicheskoi respublike, 1798-1807 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); Grigorii L. Arsh, 
Eteristskoe dvizhenie v Rossii. Osvoboditel'naia bor'ba grecheskogo naroda v nachale XIX v. i 
russko-grecheskie sviazi (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), idem, l Kapodistriia i grecheskoe 
natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie, 1809-1822 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976); 
Anatolii V. Fadeev, Rossiia i vostochnyi krizis 20-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 
1958); and Vitalii I. Sheremet, Turtsiia i Adrianopol'skii mir 1829 goda: iz istorii 
vostochnogo voprosa (Moscow: Nauka, 1975). Additional works, by Georgiev and 
Dostian, are cited below. 
4 N . N . Lisovoi, ed., Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Dokumenry i materialy, 2 vols. (Moscow: 
Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), with an introduction to Russian activity in 
Palestine by editor Lisovoi , 1: 12-17. The vast majority of these records describes the 
endeavors of the Russian consulate-general in Jerusalem ( 1858-1914), the Palestine 
Commission in the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry ( 1864-69), the Impe-
rial Orthodox Palestine Society ( 1882-1918), and the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in 
Jerusalem (1847-1918). Useful earlier studies, though they did not draw on AVPRI 
sources, are Theofanis G . Stavrou, Russian Interests in Palestine: A Study of Religious and 
Educational Enterprise (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963); Derek Hop-
wood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 184~1914: Church and Politics in the 
Near East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); and Stephen K. Batalden and Michael D . 
Palma, "Orthodox Pilgrimage and Russian Landholding in Jerusalem: The British Co-
lonial Record," in Stephen K. Batalden, ed. , Seeking God· The Recovery of Religious Iden-
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This collection of documents should serve as a model and a prompt 
for the publication of additional AVPRI holdings on Russian activ-
ities in the Ottoman Empire and the Orthodox East, and the 
enlarged resource base will no doubt facilitate research on all 
aspects of tsarist policy. 
A common Orthodox faith and a shared Byzantine civilization 
opened various avenues of religious contact and interaction 
between Muscovy and the Ottoman-ruled Orthodox East in the 
16th and 17th centuries. Inspired partly by the Third Rome 
theory, Moscow's tsars and church hierarchs distributed alms and 
other forms of assistance to the patriarchates of Constantinople, 
Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Antioch; to Greek clergy and monks 
who traveled to Muscovy; and to custodians of the sacred places of 
Mount Athas, Mount Sinai, and Jerusalem. From Muscovy a 
steady stream of pilgrims, clergymen, and monks journeyed to 
Orthodox shrines and monasteries in the Near East, often return-
ing home with Byzantine religious artifacts and manuscripts. 
Greek educators, translators, and churchmen who migrated to 
Muscovy brought with them elements of Greek learning and schol-
arship, which helped fuel the reform efforts of Patriarch Nikon to 
purify Russian church texts and rituals. Orthodox brotherhoods in 
Nezhin and Lvov, funded partially by Muscovite, Greek, and 
Balkan merchants, founded schools and churches to defend 
Orthodoxy against Roman Catholicism in the embattled Ukraine. 
Such were the most salient features of Moscow's religious link to 
the Orthodox East before the Imperial era.5 
tity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1993), 251---63. 
5 For an introduction to the extensive literature on these religious ties, see Boris L. 
Fonkich, Grechesko-russkie kultur 'nye sviazi v XV-XVII vv.: Grecheskie rukopisi v 
Rossii (Moscow: Nauka, 1977); idem, "Russia and the Christian East from the Six-
teenth to the First Quarter of the Eighteenth Century," Modem Greek Studies Yearbook 
7 (1991): 439---61; Nikolai F. Kapterev, Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k pravoslavnomu 
vostoku v XVI i XVII stoletiiakh (Sergiev Posad: Izdanie knizhnogo magazina M. S. 
Elova, 2nd ed., 1914); idem, Snosheniia ierusalimskogo patriarkha Dosiftia s russkim 
pravitel'stvom (1669-1701) (Moscow: TipografiiaA. I. Snegirevoi, 1891). On Russian 
travelers to the Greek East, many of whom recorded their impressions and observations 
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Religion continued to figure prominently in Russia's relations 
with the Near East during the 18th and 19th centuries, when Rus-
sian interests formed part of the larger European rivalry known as 
the Eastern Question. Beginning in the reign of Catherine the 
Great, the question of great power expansion and penetration at 
the expense of the Ottoman Empire became a complex and multi-
faceted issue for Russia, as the pursuit of military, commercial, and 
diplomatic aims combined with the defense of Eastern Orthodoxy. 
The landmark Treaty ofKutchuk-Kainardji (1774) granted Russia 
not just unrestricted trade access to the Black Sea and the Levant 
and consular representation throughout the Ottoman Empire but 
explicit rights of interceding for the sultan's Orthodox subjects who 
resided in Moldavia and Wallachia. Additionally, Article Seven 
articulated the Porte's promise to "protect constantly the Christian 
religion and its churches" in the Ottoman realm, while Article 
Fourteen permitted Russia's diplomatic mission in Istanbul to 
build an Orthodox church in the Galata quarter, the enclave of 
European embassies and residences, and to safeguard the clergy 
and caretakers of this one particular church.6 
The Kutchuk-Kainardji Treaty not only widened the parameters 
of tsarist endeavors in the Near East but often concealed Russian 
of holy shrines, see Theofanis G. Stavrou and Peter R. Weisensel, Russian Travekrs to the 
Christian East from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Centuries ( Columbus, Oh.: Slavica Pub-
lishers, 1986), and K. Urguzova et al. , eds., Sviatye mesta vblizi i iuiali: Putevye zametki 
russkikh pisateki I poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, RAN and 
Shkola-Press, 1995). 
6 An English translation of the treaty appears in Jacob C. Hurewirz, ed., The Middk East 
and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record Volume 1: European Bcpan-
sion, 1535-1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd ed., 1975), 92-101. Also see 
Roderic Davison, "'Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility': The Treaty of Kuchuk 
Kainardji Reconsidered," in Roderic Davison, ed., Essays in Ottoman and Turkish His-
tory, 1774--1923: The Impact of the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 29-
50; and Elena I. Druzhinina, Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda: ego podgotovka i 
zakliuchenie (Moscow: Nauka, 1955). On the broader import of the treaty for the East-
ern Question, see Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774--1923: A Study in 
International Relatiom (London: Macmillan, 1966), and Vladimir A. Georgiev, et al., 
Vostochnyi vopros vo vneshnei politike Rossii: konets XV!ll-nachak XX v. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 1978). 
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interests under the guise of "religious protection." Controversy 
erupted almost immediately over the interpretation of Articles 
Seven and Fourteen, a debate prompted by the allegedly vague or 
ambiguous wording in these two religious clauses. As Roderic 
Davison contends in his meticulously crafted research, however, 
the phrasing in both articles expressed unequivocally clear and pre-
cise terms. The treaty confined Russia's right to mediate on behalf 
of Ottoman Orthodox Christians to two specific areas: the 
Danubian Principalities and the newly sanctioned Russian church 
in the Galata district oflstanbul. Everywhere else within its domin-
ion the Sublime Porte remained the rightful protector of Orthodox 
Christian worship, churches, and clergy. Yet a manifesto of 
Catherine II in 1775 spoke of advantages Russia had secured for 
Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire and put forth the gen-
eral notion that Russia had a right to protect all Orthodox subjects 
from oppression. 7 Many of Russia's rulers, diplomats, officials, and 
writers, as well as most segments of the public, clungl to this elastically 
defined meaning of the two clauses. By doing so, they perpetuated the 
widely held but spurious idea that the treaty gave Russia an ill-defined 
prerogative to intercede for all of the sultan's Orthodox Christians. 
The assertion of a comprehensive protectorship evinces the 
amalgam of religion and politics that characterized Imperial Rus-
sia's Eastern strategy. Orthodoxy constituted an integral compo-
nent of the ideology of autocracy, elevating tsars to divine-right 
stature and underscoring their duty to defend Orthodox Chris-
tians both at home and abroad. More generally, religion permeated 
the monarchical moral code which compelled tsars to uphold trea-
ties, even misinterpreted ones, as sacred obligations. Autocracy's 
sweeping claims of guardianship also built on a tradition of Russia's 
close religious and cultural bonds with Orthodox brethren in the 
Greek East, a connection that endured during the Ottoman era. 
Moreover, Islam's general tolerance of Christianity and the Otto-
man Empire's theocratic structure, which divided the sultan's sub-
7 Davison, '"Russian Skill and T urk.ish Imbecility': The Treaty ofKuchuk Kainardji Re-
considered," 37. 
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jects into millets (nations) based on religion, enabled Orthodox Chris-
tians to preserve their identity and to look upon Russia as their 
coreligionist patron and bulwark. 8 Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, 
Romanians, and other Orthodox Christians, historically tethered to 
Russia by a common faith and Byzantine culture, solicited tsarist 
financial, educational, diplomatic, and mjlitary support to deliver 
their homelands (both real and imagined) from Ottoman hegemony 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries.9 
Russia's pronouncements that treaties morally and legally bound 
her to intervene in Ottoman affairs on behalf of Orthodoxy served 
as a convenient rationale and pretext for the quest of tangible stra-
tegic aims, such as security along the porous Russo-Ottoman fron-
tier, diplomatic leverage in the Balkans, and commercial gain in the 
Black Sea and the Levant. Ambitious schemes like Catherine the 
Great's unfulfilled Greek Project, calling for her appropriately 
named grandson Konstantin to govern a revived Greek kingdom 
from Constantinople, manifest the intersection of religious and 
political designs in Russian approaches to the Eastern Question. 10 
While the regime never precisely defined the exact nature or form 
of Russia's sponsorship of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, this sup-
port included the disbursement of alms and material aid to 
8 Richard Clogg, "The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire," in Benjamin Braude and 
Bernard Lewis, eds., Christiam and fews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a 
Plural Society, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1: 185-202. This two-vol-
ume work contains additional essays on the Ottoman millet system. 
9 Barbara Jelavich has written extensively on various facets of the strained relationship be-
tween tsarist Russia and Balkan national movements in the 19th century: Russia's Bal-
kan Entanglements, 1806-1914 (New York: Cambridge U niversicy Press, 1991), Russia 
and the Fonnation of the Romanian National State, 1821-1878 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), Russia and the Greek Revolution of 1843 (Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1966), and Russia and Greece during the Regency of King Othon, 
1832-1835: Russian Documents on the First Years of Greek Independence (Thessaloniki: 
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1962). 
IO On the Greek Project, see Hugh Ragsdale, "Russian Projects of Conquest in the Eigh-
teenth Century," in Hugh Ragsdale, ed., Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Washington 
D .C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993), 82-102, and idem, "Evaluating the Traditions 
of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project," Skwonic and East European 
Review 66, no.I (1988): 91-117. 
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churches, monasteries, patriarchal sees, and other sacred sites of the 
Greek East. Russian patronage also encompassed diplomatic 
appeals in defense of broadly interpreted, if not fabricated, treaty 
rights. Of course, for the Sublime Porte, guardianship over a signif-
icant portion of its subjects proclaimed by any foreign power, let 
alone a traditional and mighty foe in territ9rial proximity, posed a 
direct political challenge. 
Alexander I hardly rejected or diminished the importance of 
Russia's presumed religious rights as a factor in shaping Eastern 
policy, as seen in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-12, a conflict 
mainly provoked by disagreements over the status of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. 11 Nevertheless, the tsar adopted a seemingly moderate 
and prudent course in Near Eastern affairs after the epic clash with 
Napoleon and the Congress ofVienna peace settlement. The Con-
cert of Europe, a system of conference diplomacy devised to ensure 
great power consensus, sought to resolve contested issues, uphold 
the balance of power, and preserve the political and territorial 
status quo in Europe. Moreover, the tsar hoped to fortify the Con-
cert's cooperative spirit with his concept of an ecumenical Holy 
Alliance, a league or fellowship of Christian states founded upon 
the precepts of monarchical solidarity, fraternal peace, and Chris-
tian brotherhood. 
In line with these principles of moderation and accord, the tsar 
and his joint foreign ministers (Karl V. Nessel'rode and loannis A. 
Kapodistrias) took a cautious and conciliatory approach in official 
affairs with the Ottoman government. 12 On several occasions in 
1816, they instructed Russia's new envoy in Istanbul, Grigorii A. 
Stroganov, to cultivate cordial ties with the Porte; to refrain from 
11 On the Russo-Turkish Warofl806--12, see Irina S. Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1972), 42-79, and Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1-24. 
12 On the views and careers of Kapodistrias and Nessel' rode during their stints as foreign 
ministers in the Alexandrine era, see Patricia Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexan-
der l- Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Dipwmacy, 1801-1825 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1969), 194-286, and Harold N . lngle, Nesselrodeand the 
Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836-1844 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976), 1-26. 
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threats when negotiating disputed points regarding Moldavia, 
Wallachia, Serbia, and Black Sea merchant shipping; and to 
comply with provisions of existing treaties. Above all, the ambassa-
dor had to act with restraint, patience, and forbearance in all of his 
discussions with Ottoman officials and European envoys about 
Russian interests in the region. 13 
As for the specific matter of Turkey's Orthodox Christians, the 
ambassador had to assure the Porte that Russia's intercession was 
neither incompatible with the stability of the Ottoman Empire nor 
harmful to the concerns of other European powers. The Foreign 
Ministry exhorted Stroganov to demonstrate, through his words 
and deeds, that Russia sought friendly relations founded upon gen-
uine trust, shared principles, and identical interests. 14 For instance, 
the tsar rejected the misguided assumption that Christian subjects 
could actually better their lot through acts of rebellion against their 
legitimate sovereign. Instead, the emperor hoped that the Porte, 
without resorting to force of arms, religious abuse, or administrative 
misrule, could find ways to remove cause for discord among Otto-
man Christians and thus make them loyal and obedient subjects. 
Furthermore, according to the same directive from the Foreign 
Ministry, Alexander I had no plans or intent to undertake hostile 
actions against the Ottoman government; on the contrary, the tsar 
anticipated that changes in Ottoman treatment of Christian sub-
jects would in fact strengthen the cohesion and stability of the 
Ottoman Empire. If aggressive designs, bent on exploiting Otto-
man weakness, actually guided Russia's policy, the tsar would not 
attempt to allay Ottoman fears or to eliminate sources of friction 
within the sultan's realm. He would simply allow disagreements 
and problems between the two neighboring states to fester, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of war. Instead, Alexander I wanted to 
preserve the peace with Turkey, and for this end placed his trust in 
the wisdom of the Ottoman government. 
13 vPR9 (1974): 168-76, 207-12, 704---07. On tsarist policy in the Balkans and the Near 
East after the Congress of Vienna, see Jelavich, Balkan Entanglements, 24-41, and 
Dostian, Rossiia i ba!kamkii vopros, 129-95. 
14 vPR9 (1974): 170, 172, 174-76. 
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Such is the general spirit and tone of the document presented 
here, Foreign Minister Nessel'rode's instruction of June 1816 to 
envoy Stroganov on the topic of Russia's attitude toward Ottoman 
Orthodox subjects, or "Christians of the East." 15 The tsar's stance, 
motivated by the "immutable principles" of moderation, consen-
sus, and reciprocity, underscored the importance of three factors: 
previous treaty agreements; Russia's "moral obligations"; and "the 
genuine interests ofTurkey itself." By showing more respect for the 
religious and civil rights of Orthodox Christians, the Porte would 
win their allegiance and loyalty and thus reinforce the realm's inter-
nal security, order, and well-being. In accord with the tsar's position 
and aims, Stroganov had to intercede amicably but repeatedly on 
behalf of Russia's Orthodox coreligionists. 
A second issue raised in the Nessel'rode communique concerns 
the current status of the age-old and seemingly intractable "monks' 
quarrel" over the major Christian battlegrounds of sacred memory. 
This bitter dispute between Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, 
and other Christian sects dealt with Ottoman Jerusalem's holy 
places, most notably the Church of the Resurrection, also called the 
Church of the Holy Sepulcher, built over the tomb of Christ. By 
the start of the 19th century, the sultan's government had awarded 
preferential worship and custodial privileges to the Catholics and 
the Orthodox, the two primary antagonists, but the latter had 
assumed control over a larger portion of the Church of the Resur-
rection. After a fire in 1808 damaged the shrine's wooden dome, 
Franciscan monks and Greek church officials competed to win 
Ottoman permission for the right to repair the church, a pivotal 
concession in view of an unwritten rule governing and indeed exac-
erbating the conflict: the Porte recognized as the "owner" of a par-
ticular holy spot any religious community that gained the sultan's 
favor to restore, wash, or sweep that site. 16 
Understandably, by virtue of Russia's Orthodox connection to 
15 VPR9 (1974): 187-90. 
16 For an introduction to the scholarly literature on the holy places' dispute, see T. V. 
Nosenko, "Konflikt vokrug Sviacykh mest v lerusalime i politika Rossii (konets XVIII-
XIX w.)," in Lisovoi, ed., Rossiia v Sviatoi Zemle. Dokumenty i materiafy, 2: 613-25; 
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the Greek East, including alms from state and church sources for 
the upkeep of monasteries and holy places, Greek hierarchs turned 
to their coreligionist advocate in St Petersburg. Another impetus 
for soliciting tsarist help came from the Treaty of Kutchuk-
Kainardji, not just the controversial religious protection clauses but 
the Porte's pledge in Article Eight to allow free and unimpeded pas-
sage for Russian pilgrims who traveled to the holy sites. Patriarch 
Polykarp of Jerusalem petitioned Alexander I, several government 
ministers, and the Holy Synod for monetary assistance to defray 
some of the actual reconstruction costs. Russian relief would also 
reduce the debts of the holy city's patriarchal see, incurred when 
hierarchs had to proffer tribute and gifts to Ottoman officials in 
return for authorization to construct or renovate churches. 
Though the Greeks' position as custodian of the Holy Sepulcher 
improved as a result of their eventual restoration of Christianity's 
paramount shrine, Roman Catholics and Armenian Christians 
continued to press their own claims for worship and upkeep rights 
in the Church of the Resurrection and at other sacred places. Thus, 
in his appeals to Russian patrons, Patriarch Polykarp summoned 
tsarist mediation to shield Orthodox believers from harassment 
and interference by rival sects. 17 
The renewed controversy over the Holy Sepulcher sparked the 
attention and support of the tsar, as Nessel'rode asserts in his direc-
tive to Stroganov. Russian aid and donations for the Greek church 
Amos Elon, Jerusalem: Battlegrounds of Memory (New York: Kodansha America, Inc., 
1995); Thomas A. Idinopulos,jerusalem: A History ofthe Holiest City as Seen Through the 
Struggles of Jews, Christiam, and Muslims ( Chicago: I van R. Dee, Inc., 1994); Francis E. 
Peters,jerusalem: The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims, and Prophets 
from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modem Times (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1985). On the Church of the Resurrection and its various chapels, alters, 
and passageways commemorating the sites of Christ's crucifixion, burial, and resurrec-
tion, also see Charles Coiiasnon, The Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1974). 
17 On Polykarp's appeals for Russian aid, see VPR9 (1974): 702-3, and Alexandre Popoff, 
La question des lieux saints de Jerusalem dam la correspondance diplomatique Russe du XIX 
siecle. 1 partie (1800-1850) (St Petersburg: Imprimerie Russo-Frarn;aise, 1910), 1-7. 
The patriarch of Jerusalem resided in Istanbul; he was thus in close proximity to the 
Russian embassy and channeled his aid requests through tsarist envoys. 
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in Jerusalem included the tsar's grant of twenty-five thousand 
rubles in banknotes, a sum placed at the disposal of the Foreign 
Ministry and earmarked for the envoy's safe delivery to Patriarch 
Polykarp. Stroganov also had to convince the Porte that Orthodox 
Christians should be allowed to perform their rites of worship at all 
the sacred places without any encumbrances or restrictions from 
other denominations. Once again, the Foreign Ministry advised 
the ambassador to press home this point on the basis of the under-
lining principles of tsarist Eastern strategy-moderation, concord, 
goodwill-and to remind the Porte of the tangible benefits it stood 
to gain. By guaranteeing the protection of Orthodox subjects, the 
sultan's regime would have every right to expect gratitude from the 
empire's largest single Christian community, a prospect that would 
serve the interests of both justice and the Ottoman state. 
Subsequent communiques to Stroganov from the Foreign Min-
istry continued to address the quandary over the holy places and to 
suggest ways to settle the feud once and for all. 18 In a memorandum 
of December 1818, Foreign Minister Kapodistrias informed the 
envoy that Alexander I's abiding concern for the status of the Holy 
Sepulcher was inspired by his feelings of Christian piety and broth-
erhood, his protection of Orthodoxy, and his duty toward the siz-
able numbers of Russian pilgrims who trekked to Jerusalem every 
year. The tsarist perspective, according to the dispatch, called for 
resolving the dispute through negotiation, reconciliation, and 
coexistence. In talks with the French ambassador in Istanbul, 
Stroganov should emphasize that newly acquired custodial privi-
leges for Orthodox Christians at the Lord's Tomb by no means 
excluded worship rights for other Christians. Indeed, the foreign 
minister wrote, "the gifts of divine mercy, manifesting themselves 
in the virtue of true piety, will hardly dry up if they extend to all 
believers" who gather in the same church to venerate the exact same 
site. Christian harmony required that Catholic and Orthodox 
faithful share fully and equally the right to perform worship ser-
18 See Popoff, La question des lieux saints de Jerusalem dam la correspondance diplomatique 
Russe, I 4- I 46. 
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vices; and under no circumstances should any denomination seek 
to exert exclusive control over the Holy Sepulcher, a notion that 
was misguided as well as "incompatible with the spirit of peace and 
meekness that must permeate all Christians." 19 Armenian Chris-
tians were to be treated fairly so that they would no longer have 
grounds for complaint or try to usurp the prerogatives of other 
believers. Finally, Russia's envoy had to use all means of persuasion 
and influence to win support from Greek Orthodox hierarchs for 
the anticipated settlement of this conflict over Christianity's cen-
tral shrine. 
The "monks' quarrel" went unresolved and remained a source of 
friction between Russia and France on the eve of the Crimean War 
in the 1850s. More broadly, Alexandrine policy toward the Porte 
after the Congress of Vienna, predicated on the precepts of moder-
ation, accord, and reciprocity, faced obstacles and dilemmas that 
called into question the viability of this approach. How to uphold 
Russia's alleged right to protect Orthodox subjects and how to 
maintain cordial ties with the Porte invariably clashed during 
Balkan unrest, such as the Greek Revolution of 1821, when Otto-
man reprisals against Orthodox clergymen and shrines forced the 
tsarist regime to walk a fine line between neutrality and interven-
tion.20 This duality would be tested in subsequent crises and dis-
putes related to the Eastern Question, with Russia often precari-
ously poised between war against the Porte or restraint and 
compromise for the sake of Europe's balance of power. The tension 
between these choices would be all the more acute when the obliga-
tion to defend Orthodox Christians beckoned as an opportunity to 
pursue strategic gains, albeit at the risk of great power hostility and 
19 VPR IO (1976): 598---602, 829-30, 833-34. 
20 Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution (DeKalb: Northern Illi-
nois University Press, 1994), 26-54; Jelavich, Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 49-75; 
and Dostian, Rossiia i balkanskii vopros, 196-237. For a political scientist's perspective, 
see Matthew Rendall, "Russia, the Concert of Europe, and Greece, 1821-29: A Test of 
Hypotheses about the Vienna System," Security Studies 9, no.4 (2000) : 52-90. On the 
holy places' dispute and other factors that contributed to the Crimean War, see David 
M. Goldfrank, The Origins of the Crimean War (New York: Longman, 1994). 
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at the expense of human and material resources in Balkan wars that 
often produced paltry dividends for Russia. 21 
Examining AVPRI materials, both published and unpublished, 
may not profoundly alter the main contours of our understanding 
of tsarist Eastern policy. Yet new details will inevitably deepen our 
knowledge, suggest new lines of inquiry, and remind scholars and 
students alike of the multiple facets of Russian involvement in the 
Eastern Question, including religion and philanthropy. 
In preparing this document, I have relied on the published French 
original and its Russian translation and aimed to render the work 
into clear and idiomatic English without modifying its essential 
spirit or meaning. Though I have made slight changes in sentence 
structure, syntax, punctuation, and wording for the sake of fluidity, 
I have generally remained faithful to the particulars of the docu-
ment's style and perspective. My own emendations appear m 
brackets, and I have added an occasional explanatory note. 
''A Supplementary Instruction from Karl V. Nessel'rode 
to Envoy Grigorii A. Stroganov in Constantinople," 
13/25 June 181622 
The detailed instructions which the emperor deemed neces-
sary to provide his envoy at the Ottoman Porte, informing 
him of the immutable principles that His Imperial Majesty 
firmly intends to follow in all of his relations with this border-
ing state, indicate clearly enough the general point of view re-
quired to examine the attitude of Russia toward the Christian 
subjects of the Porte. 23 
The right to protect them openly through active and 
friendly intercession with the Turkish government rests on 
21 Barbara Jelavich's Balkan Entanglements remains the best introduction to tsarist Russia's 
complicated, and rarely rewarding, involvement in Balkan affairs. 
22 VPR9 (1974): 187-90. In the 19th century, Russia marked time by the OldSryleJulian 
calendar, which was twelve days behind the New Style Gregorian calendar used in the 
West and adopted in Russia in 1918. 
23 On this "general point of view," see VPR9 (1974): 168-76 (cited above in note#l3). 
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sufficiently solid grounds and on equally legitimate consider-
ations. Such grounds can be found in the texts of the treaties 
themselves and in the nature of our previous relations with 
the Sublime Porte. 24 The specified considerations emanate 
from the moral obligations assumed by Russia toward the 
Christian peoples of the East and from ,the genuine interests 
of Turkey itself. 
Indeed, one cannot but recognize that the more the Turk-
ish government undertakes to respect the civil rights and reli-
gious privileges of the Christians under its supreme authority, 
the more reason it will have to expect their allegiance to their 
native land through ties engendered by their well-being and 
security. These principles constantly guided the policy of His 
Imperial Majesty during the recent events that changed the 
face of Europe, and their application with the support of his 
most august allies produced quite favorable results during the 
European settlement in general;25 hence, His Imperial Maj-
esty does not doubt that powers friendly to Russia and the 
Porte will observe with satisfaction as [the envoy] insinuates 
the very same precepts of [this] moderate policy to the Turk-
ish government in a congenial way. The emperor thus cannot 
retreat from this course in his empire's subsequent relations 
with the Sublime Porte. Consequently, he urges his envoy, 
Baron Stroganov, to devote the most assiduous attention to 
that part of his entrusted mission that deals with protecting 
Christians of the East and to display special interest in guar-
anteeing and restoring their legitimate rights, privileges, and 
benefits. All these questions, in an essential way, pertain to 
the concerns of religion [in general] and of the predominant 
Christian denomination in Turkey [in particular]. 
The pressing and repeated appeals of the Jerusalem patri-
arch to the Most Holy Synod of the Russian church helped 
draw the explicit attention of His Imperial Majesty to this 
24 Subsequent Russo-Ottoman pacts, such as the TreacyofJassy (1792) and the Treacy of 
Bucharest (1812), reaffirmed the Treacy of Kutchuk-Kainardji. For the texts of these 
later agreements, see Hurewi cz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, 
105-9, 193-97. 
25 A reference to the Congress of Vienna peace settlement. 
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subject. 26 Upon learning in great detail of the misfortunes 
that have recently beset the cradle of Christianity, His Impe-
rial Majesty reached the conclusion chat two basic reasons ex-
plain the onerous position in which the [Greek Orthodox] 
church of Palestine finds itself: 
1. lack of monetary resources, which could have alleviated 
the burden of debts incurred during the reconstruction 
of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher; 
2. harassments and all sorts of impositions, by which the 
adherents of other faiths strive to gain exclusive posses-
sion of the Church of the Resurrection and of [other] 
holy places in the vicinity of Jerusalem. 
To help remedy the first difficulty, apart from numerous 
collections of donations which he auch~orized and deigned to 
promote in his empire, His Imperial Majesty expressly in-
structs his envoy to transmit to the Jerusalem patriarch, as se-
cretly as possible so as not to compromise chis ecclesiastic, 
twenty-five thousand rubles in banknotes, a sum attached to 
chis dispatch and placed at the disposal of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. 27 
As for the second obstacle, arising from the intrigues and 
arbitrary interference chat constantly imperil the church of 
Jerusalem, His Imperial Majesty directs envoy Baron Strog-
anov to make chis issue the object of amicable and repeated 
representations to the Sublime Porte. By conveying to the 
Turkish government the satisfaction His Imperial Majesty 
would feel if [the Porte] extended protection to the majority 
of Ottoman Christian subjects during the observance of their 
rites of divine worship in Jerusalem, [and] by comparing chis 
system of protection to the relationships between the various 
denominations that prevailed until the past decade, Baron 
Stroganov will manage to convince the Ottoman ministry 
that Russia's mediation stems from the most disinterested 
motives, fully coinciding with the actual interests of the Sub-
26 A reference to Patriarch Polycarp's appeals, cited above in note #17. 
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lime Porte. As proof of chis truth, the envoy should make use 
of the general principle sec forth above and apply it co the in-
ternal situation of the Ottoman Empire. For obviously, by 
rendering just protection co Christians of the Orthodox faith, 
the Porte gains from chis [action] the right to their gratitude 
and [thus] advances its own interests. On the contrary, by al-
lowing the unjust claims of outsiders and by assisting chem, 
the Porte only brings harm to its true interests and security 
and derives no benefit from a tolerance as objectionable co 
raison d'etat as co justice. 
The envoy of His Imperial Majesty should put forth these 
reasons in the most favorable light, without neglecting at the 
same time to give chem proper legal form, so chat Christians 
of the Orthodox faith will obtain once and for all the privi-
leges they have enjoyed from time immemorial in Jerusalem 
and its environs. 
Every time the opportunity arises for His Imperial Maj-
esty's envoy co make an official or indirect appeal on this 
point, he must cake care not to overlook the importance of 
protecting individuals and of not jeopardizing the safety of 
anyone who might provoke the suspicion of the Sublime 
Porte. 
The envoy muse pay heed co all questions of a similar na-
ture relating co the [religious] or civil rights of Christians dis-
persed in the rest of Turkey. His Imperial Majesty relies 
entirely on the zeal and good sense [of his envoy] in the en-
deavor co reconcile all viewpoints and co realize the aim of an 
intervention as beneficial as it is legitimate. 
